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I. INTRODUCTION 
A boy’s life can change in seconds.1 Alex is fourteen years old and sits alone 
at a table with two chairs in a dim, empty room that has only a closed door, and a 
large horizontal mirror across one wall.2 He sits anxiously in silence as his heart 
pumps rapidly and fear begins to settle over him.3 Seconds turn to minutes; 
 
* J.D. Candidate, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred May 2018; B.S., 
Criminal Justice, California State University of Sacramento, 2014. I would like to thank my faculty advisor, 
Distinguished Professor of Law Michael Vitiello, primary editor, Heather, and chief comment editor, Charles, 
for their tremendous support, guidance, and suggestions. Also, to my family for always believing in me and 
encouraging me when I need it the most. Lastly, but never least, to my high school sweetheart Debbie for being 
the driving force behind everything I do, and for reminding me of what is truly important in life.   
1. Cf. Erik Ortiz, Davontae Sanford, Wrongly Convicted of 4 Murders at Age 14, to Be Freed, NBC NEWS 
(June 8, 2016, 10:57 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/davontae-sanford-wrongly-convicted-4-
murders-age-14-be-freed-n588206 (on file with The University of Pacific Law Review). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
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minutes turn to hours.4 He keeps asking himself, “Why am I here, can’t I just go 
home?”5 
Just yesterday, Alex was sitting at school in history class searching for the 
perfect colored pencil to take notes with.6 It was a normal day until two 
uniformed police officers rushed into the classroom; their eyes on Alex, Alex’s 
eyes on their holstered guns.7 They picked Alex up, handcuffed him, and escorted 
him to the back of their patrol car.8 Now, he sits alone in this interrogation room.9 
He wants to talk to his mom, but he can’t.10 He wants to go home, but he can’t.11 
The door slams open and the same officers walk towards him.12 “Do you 
understand your rights?”13 He doesn’t, but he doesn’t want them to think he’s not 
listening to them, so he says, “Yes.”14 For the next hour, the officers explain that 
he is implicated in a home robbery that occurred near the school last week.15 He 
denies it, but they persist.16 They tell him they have the evidence to prove it even 
though they don’t, and that he should tell them the truth so he can finally go 
home.17 But he doesn’t go home, Alex sits in jail for ten years until his innocence 
is proven.18 
Although hypothetical, Alex's case seems rare—but indeed cases like this 
happened in 1962, recently in 2016, and can be seen in trending documentaries 
like the Netflix show Making a Murderer.19 Juveniles are still being questioned 
without knowing that they hold constitutional rights that protect them from being 
forced to talk to the police.20 For example, in 1962, fourteen-year-old Robert 
Gallegos and a friend robbed and assaulted an older man for thirteen dollars.21 
















18. Cf. Ortiz, supra note 1.  
19. Id.; see also Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962); Steve Almasy, ‘Making a Murderer’: 
Brendan Dassey Conviction Overturned, CNN (August 12, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/ 2016/08/12/us/making-
a-murderer-brendan-dassey-conviction-overturned/ (on file with The University of Pacific Law Review). 
20. Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 49; Almasy, supra note 19. 
21. Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 49. 
22. Id. at 50. 
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or attorney advise him of his rights or on what to do in this situation.23 Gallegos’s 
mother attempted to visit him but was not allowed to see him.24 Finally, after a 
week of being held in juvenile hall, he signed a formal confession.25 Using his 
formal confession against him, the jury found Gallegos guilty and sentenced him 
to life in prison.26 
The U.S. Supreme Court held Gallegos’s confession was involuntary.27 The 
Court reasoned that Gallegos “cannot be compared with an adult in full 
possession of his sense[s] and knowledgeable of the consequences of his 
admissions.”28 Without advice about his rights and the benefit of more mature 
judgment, Gallegos, according to the court, “would have no way of knowing 
what the consequences of his confession were,” or “the steps he should take in 
the predicament in which he found himself.”29 
Originally, the Supreme Court evaluated confessions under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteen Amendment.30 The Court evaluated the specific facts of 
each case under the totality of the circumstances to determine if a confession was 
given voluntarily.31 After deciding several cases, the Court found that the 
relevant factors from these cases did not create an easily-applicable standard to 
guide law enforcement and decided to create a bright-line rule.32 The Court in 
Miranda v. Arizona stated that some form of protection is necessary during 
inherently coercive interrogations to ensure a suspect actually knows his rights 
and can exercise them.33 Miranda declared that warnings34 are required before 
police can conduct a custodial interrogation of a suspect.35 However, Miranda’s 
broad protections were subsequently narrowed, making it easy to waive these 
rights, yet difficult to invoke them.36 
Today, when an officer provides a juvenile these familiar Miranda 





26. Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 50. 
27. Id. at 61. 
28. Id. at 54. 
29. Id. 
30. Infra Part II. 
31. Infra Part II. 
32. Infra Part II. 
33. 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966). 
34. Id. (“[H]e must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything 
he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if 
he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.”). 
35. Id. 
36. Infra Part III. 
37. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479 (”He has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used 
against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an 
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rights.38 However, comprehension studies consistently show that juveniles fail to 
understand the words, meaning, and legal significance of the Miranda 
warnings.39 Accordingly, juveniles are left defenseless during coercive 
interrogations.40 When faced against skilled officers, an uninformed juvenile can 
falsely confess without understanding the life-altering consequences of 
succumbing to the pressures of his or her interrogators.41 For example, Gallegos 
was “not equal to the police in knowledge and understanding of the 
consequences,” and was “unable to know how to protect his own interests[,] or 
how to get the benefits of his constitutional rights.”42 Interrogating juveniles, like 
Gallegos or Alex, without any type of effective warning treats them as if they 
have no constitutional rights.43 
Miranda is only effective if understood by the listener.44 Juveniles exist in a 
pre-Miranda era, and fail to understand the rights and privileges they are entitled 
to, yet, are subjected to an inherently coercive interrogations.45 As a 
consequence, almost all juveniles “waive” their Miranda rights because court-
crafted legal standards make it difficult for juveniles to invoke their rights.46 
Miranda fails to recognize juvenile developmental immaturity by treating them 
as adults.47 Ignoring their unique characteristics deprives them of these 
fundamental rights and provides only constitutional words without any real 
significance.48 
Miranda must return to its spirit and purpose and be reexamined to 
adequately protect juveniles whose unique characteristics make them “an easy 
victim of the law.”49 Either the legislature or the courts must take the initiative to 
restore Miranda.50 Some states have enacted legislation to do just that, and others 
have attempted but failed.51 In 2016, California took this initiative with Senate 
Bill 1052.52 Exploring the essential characteristics that adequate legislation must 
have can assist legislatures in either drafting legislation or attempting to amend 
 
attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.”). 
38. Infra Part II. 
39. Infra Part IV. 
40. Infra Part IV. 
41. Infra Part IV. B. 
42. Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962). 
43. Id. at 55. 
44. Infra Part IV. 
45. Infra Parts II & III. 
46. Infra Part IV. 
47. Infra Parts II & IV. 
48. Compare infra Part II, with III, and IV. 
49. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948). 
50. Infra Part V. 
51. Infra Part V. 
52. SB 1052, 2016 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (as amended on Mar. 28, 2016, but not enacted).  
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existing legislation.53 Additionally, recent Supreme Court cases illustrate the 
Court’s recognition and sympathy for the unique characteristics of juveniles that 
justify a return to Miranda’s broad protection.54 Counsel for juveniles can 
pressure courts to take the initiative to reexamine Miranda and the holdings that 
transformed it.55 
Part II of this Comment explains the significance of the Due Process Clause, 
the right to remain silent, the Miranda decision, and subsequent cases that 
narrowed Miranda’s broad application.56 Part III discusses neurological, 
developmental, and legal differences between juveniles and adults that warrant 
treating juveniles differently from adults, and also examines the recent Supreme 
Court trend providing additional protection to juveniles.57 Part IV illustrates the 
unfair consequences of treating juveniles the same as adults under Miranda.58 
Part V explores two solutions: (1) legislation and its essential characteristics, 
using California’s SB 1052 as a model; and (2) reevaluation by courts of the 
current Miranda framework.59 
II. MIRANDA BACKGROUND 
Originally, the Supreme Court regulated the admissibility of confessions 
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.60 The Court 
found that physical and psychological coercion resulting in a confession violated 
the Due Process Clause and was inadmissible because the confession was not 
given as a free and rational choice.61 The Court adopted a voluntariness test that 
evaluated the admissibility of a confession by examining the totality of the 
circumstances of each individual case.62 This case-by-case approach requires a 
fact specific inquiry.63 
For example, Brown v. Mississippi was the first case where the Court struck 
down a state conviction because of how the confession was obtained.64 In Brown, 
a mob of white men went to Ed Brown’s home and accused him of a crime.65 
After he denied the accusation, the mob hung him from a tree three times, each 
 
53. Infra Part V. 
54. Infra Part III.  
55. Infra Part V.  
56. Infra Part II. 
57. Infra Part III. 
58. Infra Part IV. 
59. Infra Part V. 
60. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 279 (1936).  
61. Id. at 283; Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320–21 (1959). 
62. Brown, 297 U.S. at 287. 
63. Id. at 286. 
64. Id.  
65. Id. at 287. 
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time failing to kill him.66 Brown continued to express his innocence while the 
mob tied him to the tree and whipped him.67 Brown continued to declare his 
innocence.68 The mob left Brown’s home and two days later a deputy came to 
arrest Brown.69 Again, Brown was severely whipped.70 The deputy told Brown 
the whipping would continue unless he confessed.71 Brown succumbed and 
confessed.72 The Court found that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteen 
Amendment requires states to act in accordance with the fundamental principles 
of liberty and justice.73 The Court determined that the manner the officers 
obtained the confession was repulsive to justice, and thus, unconstitutional.74 
In later cases, the Court found confessions involuntary when officers used 
psychological manipulation or exhaustion, even in the absence of actual torture. 
In Spano v. New York, Vincent Spano shot someone after his money was taken 
from him and Spano was injured in a fight.75 After turning himself in, the police 
questioned Spano through the evening and into the early morning for eight hours 
straight.76 Spano consistently refused to answer questions and repeatedly 
requested for his attorney’s presence, but the police rejected these requests and 
the questioning persisted.77 The police then had another officer named Bruno, 
who had been Spano’s friend since childhood, attempt to get a confession out of 
Spano three times, but to no avail.78 Bruno’s fourth attempt lasted an hour, and 
Spano finally confessed.79 The Court examined these facts and determined that 
the confession was involuntarily made, and resulted in Spano’s free will being 
overcome and violated the Fourteenth Amendment.80  
  
 
66. Id. at 281. 
67. Id. 
68. Brown, 297 U.S. at 281. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 282.  
72. Id.  
73. Brown, 297 U.S. at 286. 
74. Id.  
75. Spano, 360 U.S. at 316. 
76. Id. at 319. 
77. Id. at 317–18. 
78. Id. at 319.  
79. Id. 
80. Id, at 324. 
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The Court explained the reasoning for excluding the statement: 
The abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions does not 
turn alone on their inherent untrustworthiness. It also turns on the deep-
rooted feeling that the police must obey the law while enforcing the law; 
that in the end life and liberty can be as much endangered from illegal 
methods used to convict those thought to be criminals as from the actual 
criminals themselves.81 
Thirty years after Brown, the Court established several factors to guide this 
involuntariness inquiry, but they were confusing for lower courts and law 
enforcement to apply and it was unclear what the general philosophy was.82 As a 
result, the Court desired to establish a bright-line rule.83 This bright-line rule 
would guide law enforcement and would not require an individual analysis of 
voluntariness for each confession.84 In Escobedo v. Illinois, the Court attempted 
to apply the Sixth Amendment’s protection of the assistance of counsel to create 
this bright-line rule.85 There, the Court held that officer’s violated the Sixth 
Amendment when they denied Escobedo’s request to speak to his attorney and 
did not advise Escobedo of his right to remain silent during an interrogation that 
took place before charges were filed.86 However, the Court did not pursue the 
Sixth Amendment as a means to establish a bright-line rule, but rather shifted its 
focus to the Fifth Amendment in Miranda.87 
The Fifth Amendment self-incrimination clause was originally understood to 
apply to statements made in the courtroom.88 However, in 1966, the Court 
extended this understanding to interrogations in Miranda v. Arizona.89 In 
Miranda, the Court declared all custodial interrogations to be so inherently 
coercive that each required a procedural safeguard in place to allow a suspect to 
truly exercise his or her Fifth Amendment privilege to remain silent.90 With this 
purpose in mind, the Court announced that law enforcement must advise a 
suspect of certain Miranda warnings before engaging in a custodial 
 
81. Spano, 360 U.S. at 320-21. 
82. Lawrence Herman, The Supreme Court, the Attorney General, and the Good Old Days of Police 
Interrogation, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 750–751 (1987). 
83. Id. at 752; JOSHUA DRESSLER, CRIM. PROC.: INVESTIGATING CRIME 580 (4th ed. 2010). 
84. Herman, supra note 83, at 752; DRESSLER, supra note 83, at 580.  
85. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).  
86. DRESSLER, supra note 83, at 580.  
87. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). 
88. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 563 (1892).  
89. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897) (federal prosecutions); 384 U.S. at 436 (state 
prosecutions).  
90. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 (stating that the Fifth Amendment provides a suspect with the privilege 
against compelled self-incrimination and the right to consult with counsel or have counsel present prior to or 
during police questioning). 
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interrogation.91 These warnings include advising a suspect that (1) he or she has 
the right to remain silent, (2) anything he or she says can be used against them, 
(3) he or she has the right to counsel, and (4) if they cannot afford counsel, one 
will be provided to them.92 The court created a bright-line rule applicable to all 
suspects, regardless of age, with the purpose of providing law enforcement with 
an easily enforceable and practical standard.93 Although briefly mentioned in 
Miranda, subsequent cases clarified the applicable standards for a suspect to 
either waive or invoke their Miranda rights.94 In doing so, those cases 
significantly narrowed Miranda’s broad protections.95 
For example, in Miranda the Court stated that, once a suspect is advised of 
the Miranda warnings, he or she can waive them if they do so knowing what 
rights they have, are intelligent of the consequences of waiving those rights, and 
is done voluntarily.96 However, a more conservative Court later found that as 
long as a suspect receives the Miranda warnings and then makes a voluntary 
statement, a court could presume the suspect knowingly and intelligently 
understood their rights and the consequences associated with waiving them.97 
This essentially narrowed Miranda’s original protection by narrowing when a 
suspect is considered knowledgeable and intelligent of the Miranda warnings.98 
Likewise, the Miranda Court originally indicated that, once a suspect 
invokes either the right to remain silent or the right to the assistance of counsel, 
all questioning must cease.99 But, again, the Court narrowed the broad safeguard 
intended by Miranda when it defined the standard for a suspect to adequately 
invoke their rights.100 Now, if a suspect decides he or she wishes to exercise their 
rights, they must do so unambiguously to the degree of clarity that a reasonable 
officer under the circumstances would understand that the suspect was making 
such a request.101 This unambiguous standard provides courts with the arbitrary 
power to determine what is considered a sufficiently clear request.102 For 
 
91. Id. 
92. Id. at 479; California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355 (1981) (holding that the Miranda warnings do not have 
to state the exact language in Miranda but must reasonably convey the rights included in the original four 
warnings). 
93. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479. 
94. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994). 
95. Compare Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478–79, with Davis, 512 U.S. at 459; see also Harris v. New York, 
401 U.S. 222 (1971) (allowing a confession in violation of Miranda to be used to impeach a defendant). 
96. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. 
97. Compare Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478–79, with Davis, 512 U.S. at 461–62. 
98. Compare Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478–79, with Davis, 512 U.S. at 461–62.  
99. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975). 
100. Davis, 512 U.S. at 459; People v. Soto, 204 Cal. Rptr. 204, 213 (2nd Dist. 1984). 
101. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724–25 (1979). 
102. People v. Roquemore, 131 Cal. 4th 11, 25 (2005) (“[D]efendant’s subsequent statement that he was 
confused and “[C]an I call a lawyer or my mom to talk to you?” did not constitute an unequivocal request for 
counsel to be present”); Fare, 442 U.S. at 723–24 (declining “to find that the request for the probation officer is 
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example, the Court held that when a suspect decides to merely sit in silence after 
being advised that he or she has the right to remain silent, and is subsequently 
questioned by law enforcement, they fail to unambiguously invoke their right to 
remain silent.103 Such a requirement runs contrary to the colloquial meaning of 
“remaining silent” and has narrowed the originally broad protection in 
Miranda.104 
Generally, juveniles are unable to understand and comprehend the Miranda 
warnings105 and this narrowing makes it difficult for them to meet the stringent 
standards to invoke their rights.106 Juveniles are essentially defenseless to 
continuous police badgering, yet capable of easily waiving their rights.107 
III. JUVENILES: A SPECIAL CATEGORY 
As a result of Miranda’s bright-line rule, its standards apply to all suspects, 
and therefore juveniles under custodial interrogation are generally treated as if 
they were fully developed adults.108 Juveniles receive the same Miranda 
warnings,109 and if they wishes to waive these rights, they may do so as easily as 
an adult by simply making an uncoerced statement after receiving these 
warnings.110 Yet, if they chooses to end the questioning and invoke their rights, 
they are expected to express such a request under the same unambiguous 
standard as an adult.111 
However, juveniles hold unique developmental characteristics and 
vulnerabilities that warrant treating them differently than adults.112 Treating 
juveniles differently ensures that they have a meaningful opportunity to exercise 
the same rights and privileges as adults.113 Part A illustrates how juveniles are 
developmentally immature by examining emerging cognitive and developmental 
 
tantamount to a request for an attorney”). 
103. Davis, 512 U.S. at 459. 
104. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79 (1966). 
105. Infra Part IV. 
106. Infra Part IV. 
107. Infra Part IV. 
108. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 380 (2010) (failing to differentiate a separate standard for 
a suspect to waive their rights depending on their age); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374 (1979) 
(finding a defendant with an 11th grade education is held to the voluntary, knowing, and intelligent standard); 
People v. Whitson, 949 P.2d 18, 28 (Cal. 1998). 
109. See generally In re Joseph H., 367 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2015). 
110. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994). 
111. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724–25 (1979). 
112. Infra Part A. 
113. Infra Part V. 
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science.114 Part B explains how the Court recognizes this immaturity in other 
legal contexts and how the Miranda framework is behind this trend.115 
A. Developmental Immaturity 
The problem with treating juveniles the same as adult is that juveniles are 
psychologically and physiologically different than adults.116 Brain development 
happens in stages throughout the juvenile’s adolescent years, creating different 
thinking and behavior.117 His or her frontal lobe, which regulates decision-
making, planning, judgment, and impulse control, drastically changes during 
their adolescent years and is the last part of their brain to fully develop.118 
Because of the under-development of the frontal lobe, the limbic system stands in 
for the frontal lobe to process their emotions.119 However, the limbic system also 
undergoes rapid development during their adolescent years, causing them to 
engage in more impulsive behavior and experience more mood swings than 
adults.120 Additionally, dopamine production, a chemical linking action to 
pleasure, significantly shifts during their adolescent years causing them to engage 
in more risky behavior.121 However, when juveniles make these risky choices, 
they do not engage the higher thinking areas of the brain, as opposed to adults 
who do.122 
Also, juveniles are less future-oriented than adults.123 Juveniles generally 
believe planning ahead is a waste of time, are more focused on being happy in 
the present, and fail to consider the multiple consequences of making a 
 
114. Infra Part A. 
115. Infra Part B. 
116. Jay N. Giedd et al., Brain Development During Childhood and Adolescence: A Longitudinal MRI 
Study, NATURE NEUROSCIENCE Vol. 2, no. 10 (1999). 
117. See, id. at 861; Jay N. Giedd, Structural Magnetic Resonance Imaging of the Adolescent Brain, in 
ADOLESCENT BRAIN DEVELOPMENT: VULNERABILITIES AND OPPORTUNITIES, ed. Ronald E. Dahl and Linda 
Patia Spear, Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, Vol. 1021 (2004); Nitin Gogtay et al., Dynamic 
Mapping of Human Cortical Development During Childhood Through Early Adulthood, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE 101, 8174 (2004); Arthur W. Toga, Paul M. Thompson, & Elizabeth R. 
Sowell, Mapping Brain Maturation, TRENDS IN NEUROSCIENCES Vol. 29, no. 3, 148–59 (Mar. 2006).  
118. See, Giedd, supra note 861; Giedd, supra note 118; Gogtay, supra note 118; Toga, supra note 118. 
119. Using Adolescent Brain Research to Inform Policy: A Guide for Juvenile Justice Advocates, NAT’L 
JUV. JUST. NETWORK, (last visited Apr. 7, 2017), http://www.njjn.org/uploads/digital-library/Brain-
Development-Policy-Paper_Updated_FINAL-9-27-12.pdf.. 
120. Id. 
121. Linda Patia Spear, Neurodevelopment During Adolescence, in 12 MECHANISMS IN 
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY, ed. Dante Cicchetti and Elaine F. Walker, 62-83 (Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
122. Neir Eshel et al., Neural Substrates of Choice Selection in Adults and Adolescents, 
NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA Vol. 45, no. 6, 1270–79 (2007). 
123. Laurence Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Future Orientation and Delay Discounting, 80 CHILD 
DEV. 28, 34 (2009).  
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decision.124 Similarly, while adults perceive multiple options in a particular 
situation, juveniles may perceive only one, further limiting their understanding of 
how to escape a difficult situation.125 Juveniles are also less capable of 
responding to stressful situations than adults because they lack the same exposure 
to these situations.126 Generally, juveniles are conditioned from childhood to 
respect and abide by authority figures,127 while hormonal and psychosocial 
changes make them put a higher emphasis on acceptance by others.128 This 
increases their susceptibility to peer pressure.129 These cognitive and 
developmental differences create a uniquely vulnerable suspect during a 
custodial interrogation.130 During interrogations, law enforcement agents attempt 
to overcome the will of a juvenile, and the Miranda warnings are the only 
safeguard in place to mitigate the inherently coercive nature of custodial 
interrogations.131 
B. Legally Treated Differently 
The Court treats juveniles differently from adults in other aspects of the law 
due to developmental and cognitive science.132 The Court reshaped legal 
principles as applied to juveniles to fully protect their constitutional rights.133 The 
following cases illustrate how the Miranda framework is currently behind by not 
treating juveniles differently in the interrogation room.134 
 
124. Id. 
125. Marty Beyer, Immaturity, Culpability & Competency in Juveniles: A Study of 17 Cases, 15 CRIM. 
JUST. 26 (2000); Marty Beyer, Recognizing the Child in the Delinquent, 7 KY. CHILD RTS. J. 16, 17–18 (1999). 
126. See Laurence Steinberg & Robert G. Schwartz, Developmental Psychology Goes to Court in YOUTH 
ON TRIAL: A DEV. PERSP. ON JUV. JUST 9–3; Thomas Grisso and Robert G. Schwartz eds., (2000) (explaining 
that even when older adolescents attain raw intellectual abilities comparable to those of adults, their relative 
lack of experience may impede their ability to make sound decisions). 
127. Gerald P. Koocher, Different Lenses: Psycho-Legal Perspectives on Children’s Rights, 16 NOVA L. 
REV. 711, 716 (1992) (noting that children are socialized to obey authority figures). 
128. See id. 
129. See id. (noting that children are socialized to obey authority figures); Kimberly Larson, Improving 
the “Kangaroo Courts”: A Proposal for Reform in Evaluating Juveniles’ Waiver of Miranda, 48 VILL. L. REV. 
629, 657 (2003) (summarizing psychological research reporting that “children are more compliant and 
suggestible than adults”). 
130. Margo Gardner & Laurence Steinberg, Peer Influence on Risk Taking, Risk Preference, and Risky 
Decision Making in Adolescence and Adulthood: An Experimental Study, 41 DEV. PSYCHOL. 625, 629–30 
(2005); See Beyer, supra note 125, at 27. 
131. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). 
132.. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568–69 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2042 (2010); 
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2457–58 (2012); J.B.D. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 277 (2011). 
133. Roper, 543 U.S. at 568–69; Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2042; Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2457–58; J.B.D., 564 
U.S. at 277. 
134. Compare Roper, 543 U.S. at 568–69; Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2042; Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2457–58; 
J.B.D., 564 U.S. at 277, with Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. 
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In Roper v. Simmons, seventeen-year-old Christopher Simmons committed 
murder.135 When Christopher turned eighteen, a trial judge sentenced him to 
death.136 On appeal, the Court recognized that a juvenile is “categorically less 
culpable than the average [adult] criminal.”137 As a result, the Court found it 
unconstitutional to sentence a juvenile to death.138 
The Court indicated developmental reasons why juveniles, when compared 
to adults, cannot be sentenced to death.139 First, “[j]uveniles' susceptibility to 
immature and irresponsible behavior means ‘their irresponsible conduct is not as 
morally reprehensible as that of an adult.’”140 Second, a juvenile’s “own 
vulnerability and comparative lack of control over their immediate surroundings 
mean[s] juveniles have a greater claim than adults to be forgiven for failing to 
escape negative influences in their whole environment.”141 The Court drew the 
line at the age of eighteen because it “is the point where society draws the line for 
many purposes between childhood and adulthood.”142 
In Graham v. Florida, seventeen-year-old Terrance Graham committed a 
burglary, and, as part of a plea agreement, the trial court sentenced him to 
probation.143 Subsequently, Terrance committed another crime while on 
probation, and as a result, the trial court sentenced Terrance to life in prison 
without the possibility of parole.144 The Court held that sentencing a minor to life 
in prison without the possibility of parole for committing a non-homicidal 
offense was unconstitutional.145 The Court found this punishment to be 
“especially harsh for a juvenile offender, who will on average serve more years 
and a greater percentage of his life in prison than an adult offender.”146 The Court 
also stated that a categorical rule banning this punishment “gives the juvenile 
offender a chance to demonstrate maturity and reform.”147 
In Miller v. Alabama, a jury convicted sixteen-year-old Evan Miller of 
murder and sentenced him to a mandatory term of life in prison without the 
possibility of parole.148 By studying neurology, the Court found the mandatory 
sentence of life without the possibility of parole, for a juvenile, to be 
 
135. Roper, 543 U.S. at 557. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. at 567. 
138. Id. at 570–71. 
139. Id. at 570. 
140. Id. (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988)). 
141. Roper, 543 U.S. at 570. 
142. Id. at 574. 
143. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2018 (2010). 
144. Id. (stating that Florida did not have a parole system in place at the time). 
145. Id. at 2042. 
146. Id. at 2016. 
147. Id. at 2017. 
148. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2457 (2012). 
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unconstitutional.149 The Court explained that “‘youth is more than a 
chronological fact’ . . . [i]t is a time of immaturity, irresponsibility, 
‘impetuousness[,] and recklessness’ . . . [i]t is a moment and ‘condition of life 
when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological 
damage.’”150 
These cases demonstrate how developmental and cognitive differences 
between juveniles and adults justify applying different legal standards for the 
same constitutional right.151 Recent changes to the custody analysis recognize 
these differences;152 yet, other Miranda aspects are behind this developmental 
change.153 Specifically, in J.D.B. v. North Carolina, a uniformed police officer 
and school personnel took a thirteen-year-old, seventh-grade student from his 
classroom and placed him in a closed-door conference room to question him.154 
The uniformed officer did not advise J.D.B. of his Miranda rights or tell him that 
he was free to leave.155 After the officer pressured him to tell the truth, J.D.B. 
confessed, although initially denying any involvement in the suspected 
burglary.156 After J.B.D. confessed, the officer finally read him the Miranda 
warnings.157 J.D.B. argued that he was in custody during the questioning, and, 
thus that the officer was required to advise him of the Miranda warnings before 
any questioning took place.158 
By distinguishing between juveniles and adults, the Court supplemented the 
in-custody framework of Miranda.159 In doing so, the Court stated that “children 
cannot be viewed simply as miniature adults[,] . . . [c]hildren ‘generally are less 
mature and responsible than adults,’ . . . they ‘often lack the experience, 
perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be 
detrimental to them,’ . . . and they ‘are more vulnerable or susceptible to . . . 
outside pressures’ than adults.”160 The Court justified modifying the in-custody 
framework of Miranda for juveniles by stating that “events that ‘would leave a 
man cold and unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a’ teen.”161 
 
149. Id. at 2457–58. 
150. Id. at 2467. 
151. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570–71 (2005); Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2042; Miller, 132 S. Ct. 
at 2457–58; J.B.D., 564 U.S. at 277. 
152. J.B.D. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2406 (2011). 
153. Roper, 543 U.S. at 570–71; Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2042; Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2457–58; J.B.D., 564 
U.S. at 277, with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). 
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These cases demonstrate how emerging developmental science and research 
change court application of legal principles to fairly apply them to juveniles.162 
Apart from the criminal context, society also treats juveniles different than adults 
by imposing several age restrictions on activities.163 Juveniles cannot drive 
without a learner’s permit until they are eighteen,164 serve our country without 
parental permission until eighteen,165 get married until eighteen,166 vote until 
eighteen,167 drink until twenty-one,168 buy cigarettes until twenty-one,169 convey 
real property, or execute a binding contract until they are eighteen.170 Yet, 
according to existing law, as young as ten years old, they can waive fundamental 
constitutional rights.171 
Similar to J.D.B., the Miranda framework needs to catch up and recognize 
developmental differences and not simply view juveniles as miniature adults.172 
The Miranda framework must be modified when applied to juveniles to prevent 
the unfairness associated with treating juveniles like adults.173 
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF APPLYING THE CURRENT MIRANDA STANDARD TO 
JUVENILES 
This section explains the grave and irreversible consequences of applying the 
Miranda standard to juveniles.174 Part A explains how juveniles do not 
understand and comprehend the Miranda warnings.175 Part B demonstrates how 
 
162. See infra Part III. Part B (referencing J.D.B., Miller, and Miranda).  
163. Department of Motor Vehicles, License and ID, Age Requirements, (last visited Apr. 8, 2017), 
http://www.dmv.org/ca-california/teen-drivers.php (on file with The University of Pacific Law Review). 
164. Id. 
165. United States of America, Join the Military, Requirements for Joining the U.S. Military, (last visited 
Apr. 8, 2017), https://www.usa.gov/join-military; https://www.thebalance.com/us-military-enlistment-
standards-3354001 (on file with The University of Pacific Law Review); Rod Powers, US Military Enlistment 
Standards: How Old is Too Old? Each Branch of the Service had Different Upper Age Limits, (last visited Apr. 
8, 2017), https://www.thebalance.com/us-military-enlistment-standards-3354001 (on file with The University of 
Pacific Law Review).  
166. Legal Age of Consent for Marriage and Sex for the 50 United States, Global Justice Initiative, (last 
visited Apr. 8, 2017), https://globaljusticeinitiative.files.wordpress.com/2011/12/united-states-age-of-consent-
table11.pdf.. 
167. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1. 
168. 23 C.F.R. § 1208.4. 
169. 175 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17537.3 (West 2017). 
170. I.C.1971, 32—22—1—1, BURNS s 56—102 (West 2017) (stating a juvenile is unable to convey real 
property); I.C.1971, 29—1—18—41 (West 2017), BURNS s 8—141 (West 2017) (stating a juvenile is unable to 
execute a binding contract). 
171. In re Joseph H., 367 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2015).  
172. J.B.D. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2406 (2011). 
173. Infra Part IV.  
174. Infra Part IV.  
175. Infra Part A. 
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juveniles lack the capacity to invoke these rights.176 Part C illustrates juveniles’ 
vulnerability in an interrogation room.177 
A. Juveniles Fail to Knowingly Understand and Intelligently Appreciate the 
Miranda Warnings 
How can you exercise a right you do not know you have?178 Miranda’s 
procedural safeguard is only effective if understood by the listener.179 Research 
consistently shows that juveniles fail to understand the meaning of the words 
used in Miranda, as well as the legal significance of each warning.180 When 
juveniles fail to understand the rights and privileges they have during an 
interrogation, the Miranda warnings are meaningless.181 
For example, in 1980, a published study evaluated juveniles’ understanding 
of their Miranda rights.182 When asked to paraphrase their Miranda rights, only 
20.9% of juveniles demonstrated an adequate understanding, while 42.3% of 
adults did.183 Furthermore, 55.3% of the juveniles demonstrate a lack of 
understanding of at least one of the Miranda warnings, but when assessed on 
their understanding of the vocabulary used in the Miranda warnings, only 33.2% 
of the juveniles adequately understood the key words used, while 60.1 percent of 
adults did.184 Also, 44.8% of the juveniles misunderstood their right to consult 
with an attorney prior to an interrogation or to have an attorney present during 
the interrogation, while only 14.6% of adults misunderstood these rights.185 This 
study not only indicates that juveniles are twice as likely to misunderstand the 
vocabulary and the legal significance of the Miranda warnings, but that they are 
also three times as likely to not understand their right to the assistance of 
counsel.186 
Another study in 2011 found that age and intelligence predict a juvenile’s 
comprehension of the Miranda warnings.187 Younger juveniles with lower 
 
176. Infra Part B. 
177. Infra Part C. 
178. Infra Part A.  
179. Infra Part IV.  
180. Thomas Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis, 68 CAL. L. 
REV. 1134, 1137 (1980); Kaitlyn McLachlan, Ronald Roesch & Kevin S. Douglas, Examining the Role of 
Interrogative Suggestibility in Miranda Rights Comprehension in Adolescents, 35 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 165, 170–
71 (2011). 
181. Infra Part IV.  
182. Grisso, supra note 180, at 1134. 
183. Id. at 1153. 
184. Id. at 1153–54. 
185. Id. at 1154. 
186. Id. at 1153–54. 
187. McLachlan, supra note 180, at 175.  
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intelligence were the least likely to comprehend their Miranda rights and the 
most likely to be overcome by law enforcement using negative feedback and 
pressure.188 This study found that 42.5% of juveniles189 did not comprehend one 
of the Miranda warnings, and 44.7% failed to understand some of the vocabulary 
used in the Miranda warnings.190 
These findings are consistent with other comprehension studies, showing not 
only that juveniles fail to understand the Miranda warnings but do so at an 
alarmingly high rate when compared to adults.191 However, most of these studies 
were conducted in a controlled setting and not in a highly stressful police-
dominated interrogation room that could further influence a juvenile’s ability to 
understand.192 Thus, during real, as opposed to staged settings, these findings 
may be exacerbated.193 
This lack of understanding may explain why juveniles are more likely to 
“waive” their rights since they completely fail to understand the vocabulary used 
in the Miranda warnings and its significance.194 For example, a 2006 study found 
that 80% of juveniles waive their Miranda rights.195 Other studies have found 
that as high as 90% of juveniles waive their rights.196 These studies indicate that 
an alarming percentage of juveniles waive their rights,197 yet comprehension 
studies demonstrate that half of juveniles fail to knowingly and intelligently 
 
188. Id. 
189. This study consisted of 12-19 year olds. 
190. McLachlan, supra note 180, at 170–71. 
191. Beyer, supra note 125, at 28 (reporting that more than half of juveniles did not understand the words 
of the Miranda warning); A. Bruce Ferguson & Alan Charles Douglas, A Study of Juvenile Waiver, 7 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 39, 53 (1970) (reporting that over 90% of the juveniles whom police interrogated waived their 
rights, that a similar percentage did not understand the rights they waived, and that even a simplified version of 
the language in the Miranda warning failed to cure these defects). 
192. Grisso, supra note 180, at 1152; McLachlan, supra note 180, at 170–71. 
193. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966), with Grisso, supra note 180, at 1152 and McLachlan, 
supra note 180, at 170–71. 
194. Compare McLachlan, supra note 180, at 170–71, with Barry Feld, Juveniles’ Competence to 
Exercise Miranda Rights: An Empirical Study of Policy, 91 MINN. L. REV. 26 (2006). 
195. Barry Feld, Real Interrogation: What Actually Happens When Cops Question Kids, 47 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 1, 26 (2013). 
196. Ferguson, supra note 191, at 53 (reporting that over 90% of the juveniles whom police interrogated 
waived their rights); THOMAS GRISSO, JUVENILES’ WAIVER OF RIGHTS: LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL 
COMPETENCE 202 (1981) (reporting that about ninety-one percent of juveniles waived their Miranda rights and 
agreed to talk with police); Feld, supra note 195 (indicating that 92.8 percent of the juveniles waived their 
rights). 
197. See Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the 
Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839, 844 (1996) (reporting that “of suspects given their Miranda rights, 
83.7% waived them”); Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L.& CRIMINOLOGY 266, 293 
(1996) (reporting that almost two-thirds of all suspects questioned). 
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understand what they have “waived.”198 Juveniles are, therefore, at a distinct 
disadvantage because waivers must be made knowingly and intelligently.199 
B. Juveniles Lack the Capacity to Invoke Their Rights 
Even when juveniles do not understand and comprehend the Miranda 
warnings, they can stop continuous police badgering by invoking the right to 
remain silent or the right to the assistance of counsel.200 However, how can you 
protect yourself if you do not know how?201 Courts require that an invocation be 
unambiguous, such that a reasonable officer would understand the request to be 
an invocation.202 This requirement is difficult for most juveniles to satisfy 
because they do not possess the same communication skills as adults.203 While 
almost all juveniles are found to “waive” their rights, rarely do juveniles 
unambiguously invoke their rights properly.204 
For example, a 1977 study found that only 10% of juveniles invoke their 
rights, while 40% of adults do.205 Additionally, another study found that 
randomly-selected juveniles arrested for alleged felonies invoked their rights 
10% of the time.206 The requirement for an unambiguous invocation of their 
rights is even harder to satisfy for younger juvenile suspects.207 For juveniles 
under the age of fourteen, only 5 percent invoked their rights.208 Some juveniles 
may fear an invocation could be used against them to demonstrate culpability.209 
A 1980 study found that 61.8% of juveniles failed to recognize that a judge 
cannot punish them for invoking their right to remain silent, while 21.7% of 
 
198. McLachlan, supra note 180, at 170–71. 
199. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994). 
200. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975).   
201. Infra Part B.  
202. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724–25 (1979).  
203. See id.; see also Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in 
Police Interrogation, 103 YALE L. J. 259, 262–64 (1993) (focusing on the disadvantage of the unambiguous 
standard for female defendants). 
204. Compare Ferguson, supra note 191, at 53 (reporting that over 90% of the juveniles whom police 
interrogated waived their rights), and GRISSO, supra note 196, at 202 (reporting that about ninety-one percent of 
juveniles waived their Miranda rights and agreed to talk with police), and Feld, supra note 198 (indicating that 
92.8 percent of the juveniles waived their rights), with Thomas Grisso & Carolyn Pomicter, Interrogation of 
Juveniles: An Empirical Study of Procedures, Safeguards, and Rights Waiver, 1 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 321, 339 
(1977) (reporting that about 10% of juveniles invoked their rights during interrogation). 
205. Pomicter, supra note 204, at 339 (reporting that about 10% of juveniles invoked their rights during 
interrogation, compared to 40% of adults); see also Grisso, supra note 180, at 1152. 
206. Pomicter, supra note 204, at 339.  
207. Id. 
208. Id. 
209. Grisso, supra note 180, at 1152. 
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adults recognized this.210 On the other hand, juveniles may wish to invoke their 
rights, but may lack adult-like communication skills to meet the standard for an 
unambiguous invocation of these rights.211 
Juvenile that fail to meet this standard allow law enforcement to continue to 
question them even when they wish to end the interrogation and be released from 
custody.212 These studies demonstrate that juveniles lack the communication 
skills to end police badgering.213 
C. Juveniles are Easy Victims in a Police-Dominated Environment 
2.1 million juveniles are arrest in the United States each year.214 In 2014, 
California reported that law enforcement arrested 87,000 juveniles.215 
Interrogations naturally create a coercive environment and can produce false 
confessions.216 Law enforcement is required to read suspects the Miranda 
warnings before an interrogation begins to protect against police coercion.217 
Although the Miranda warnings are meant to act as a procedural safeguard, 
interrogations still produce false confessions when Miranda is administered.218 
Significantly, juveniles account for 35% of these false confessions.219 
Juvenile are particularly vulnerable to producing false confessions.220 
Generally, they are more compliant and obedient to police officers and may 
provide false information simply to end a stressful conversation.221 Cognitive and 
developmental research indicates that juveniles are short-term oriented and fail to 
perceive long-term consequences.222 On the other hand, officers are trained to 
 
210. Grisso, supra note 180, at 1152. 
211. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724–25 (1979). 
212. See id.  
213. Compare Pomicter, supra note 204, at 339, with Fare, 442 U.S. at 724–25. 
214. Puzzanchera and Adams, Juvenile Arrests, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE (2009). 
215. Kamala D. Harris, Juvenile Justice in California, CAL. DEPT. OF JUST. REP. 56, 2 (2014), 
https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/cjsc/publications/misc/jj11/preface.pdf (on file with The University 
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216. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). 
217. Id. 
218. Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 
N. C. L. REV. 891, 907–08 (2004). 
219. Id. at 945. 
220. Id. at 919 (stating that “some individuals—particularly. . . juveniles—are more vulnerable to the 
pressures of interrogation and therefore less likely to possess or be able to muster the physiological resources or 
perspective necessary to withstand accusatorial police questioning”). 
221. See Koocher, supra note 127, at 716 (noting that children are socialized to obey authority figures); 
Larson, supra note 129, at 645–46 (summarizing psychological research reporting that “children are more 
compliant and suggestible than adults”). 
222. Steinberg, supra note 123, at 34. 
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aggressively elicit all important information.223 In reality, a false confession can 
irreversibly taint a juvenile’s subsequent trial, leading to a conviction for a crime 
they did not commit.224 Courts should view such confession with “special 
caution” because juveniles’ developmental immaturity, coupled with the lack of 
an effective safeguard advising them of their rights and persistent officer 
questioning, creates a distasteful recipe to produce unreliable information.225 
Juvenile left alone in an interrogation room without any meaningful protection 
are therefore an “easy victim of the law.”226 
V. RESTORING THE SPIRIT AND PURPOSE OF MIRANDA 
Miranda’s original broad protection needs to be restored and returned to its 
spirit and purpose.227 This is especially true for juveniles whose unique 
developmental and cognitive characteristics leave them vulnerable to police 
manipulation because they lack the capacity to knowingly and intelligently 
understand the Miranda warnings.228 This can be achieved one of two ways.229 
First, federal or state legislatures can pass laws.230 Although this option is 
unlikely due to the current political landscape, it still provides value by providing 
essential characteristics of such legislation to guide future legislatures or to 
amend currently inadequate legislation.231 Second, courts themselves can 
reevaluate the holdings that transformed Miranda.232 The current trend in 
Supreme Court jurisprudence is to recognize the unique vulnerabilities and 
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A. A Legislative Solution 
Although the Supreme Court generally requires law enforcement to provide 
Miranda warnings to a suspect,234 the Court sets only the minimum 
requirements.235 Each individual state or the federal government may choose to 
require additional requirements or safeguards so long as they provide the baseline 
notice mandated by the Court.236 State or federal legislation needs to be enacted 
to protect juveniles from inherently coercive interrogations237 and help recognize 
that they are not adults and cannot be treated as such.238 Several states currently 
recognize the unfairness of the current Miranda framework.239 This Comment 
analyzes California Senate Bill 1052 (“SB 1052”) to determine the essential 
characteristics needed for adequate legislation.240 After having passed both 
 
234. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). 
235. Id. (“We encourage congress and the States to continue their laudable search for increasingly 
effective ways of protecting the rights of the individual while promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal 
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236. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467; In re Patrick W., 104 Cal. App. 3d at 618. 
237. Infra Part IV.  
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331 (West 2016) (stating that a minor under 16 years old can waive their rights only with the agreement of their 
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parent is present and advised of the minor’s rights); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-32-5-1 (West 2016) (stating that a 
minor’s rights can be waived only by a parent or counsel unless the minor has been emancipated); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 7B-2101(West 2016) (stating that a minor under 16 years old cannot waive their Miranda rights 
unless a parent or attorney is present); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10A, § 2-2-301 (West 2016) (stating that the 
advisement of rights to a minor of 16 years or younger during a custodial interrogation must occur in the 
presence of a parent, guardian, or an attorney).  
240. SB 1052, 2016 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (as amended on Mar. 28, 2016, but not enacted) 
(SB 1052 required law enforcement to provide a juvenile with a consultation with an attorney before conducting 
a custodial interrogation and before a juvenile could waive their rights. SB 1052 rejected the notion that a 
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legislative bodies of California, California’s governor vetoed SB 1052.241 SB 
1052 provided a strong starting point, but only some of its components are useful 
for future legislation.242 
For this legislation to be effective, it must begin by requiring the presence of 
an attorney when a juvenile is interrogated.243 Under SB 1052, it was generally 
mandatory for law enforcement to provide a juvenile consultation with an 
attorney prior to questioning.244 The problem with leaving juveniles alone in an 
interrogation room is twofold. First, officers question juveniles in the same 
manner as adults.245 Second, as mentioned, juveniles are developmentally 
different than adults because they fail to understand the Miranda warnings, the 
consequences of their statements, often "waive" their rights unknowingly, and 
will almost never invoke these rights.246 Combining these ingredients creates a 
dangerous result.247 The police may receive unreliable information and terminate 
alternative explanations,248 while juveniles are left to explain in court why they 
confessed to something they did not do.249 Juveniles do not understand the 
Miranda warnings and legislation must presume that statements made by a 
juvenile are per se unknowingly and unintelligently made.250 Only after 
consulting with an attorney should this presumption be overcome.251 Like 
Miranda, legislation must create a bright-line rule applying this requirement to 
juveniles under a certain age.252 An appropriate age for this requirement would be 
eighteen because society has determined that eighteen is the age that it “draws 
the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood.”253 
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Currently, state legislation conflicts on whether the presence of an attorney is 
required or if an adult can act as an adequate alternative.254 For example, 
California’s SB 1052 required an attorney consultation, while Washington, 
Colorado, and North Carolina find the assistance of a juvenile’s parent as an 
adequate alternative to an attorney.255 The main purpose behind having either an 
attorney or an adult present is to reduce the coercive nature of an interrogation, 
but also to effectively convey to a juvenile the rights he or she has, their legal 
significance, and the consequences associated with waiving them.256 A criminal 
investigation requires a degree of sophistication and understanding of legal 
principles that a parent lacks.257 A parent cannot substitute the assistance of an 
attorney—who is the “one person to whom society as a whole looks as the 
protector of the [juvenile’s] legal rights.”258 Unlike a parent, an attorney is better 
suited to explain the constitutional rights that juveniles are entitled to, the legal 
consequences associated with waiving them, and can assist juveniles with the 
invocation of these rights.259 
Significantly, research indicates that parents either fail to assist juveniles, or, 
instead, help law enforcement by offering additional information.260 For example, 
in one study, nearly three-quarters of parents disagreed with the idea that a 
juvenile should be allowed to withhold information from the police.261 In another 
study, more than two-thirds of the parents present during actual pre-interrogation 
waiver proceedings offered no comments or advice to their children.262 An 
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attorney is not expected to have a financial or emotional interest in a case and can 
act objectively.263 Legislation must exclude parents as an adequate alternative 
and expressly require that juveniles consult with only the unmatched assistance 
of counsel.264 
State legislation also conflicts on whether such a mandatory consultation 
requirement can be waived, and, additionally, if juveniles or parents can waive 
this requirement.265 For example, North Carolina allows a sixteen-year-old 
juvenile to waive his or her rights only if a parent is present, while in Washington 
the parent of a twelve-year-old can waive rights on behalf of the child.266 SB 
1052 explicitly rejected the notion that juveniles can waive this requirement.267 
Like SB 1052, legislation must reject juveniles’ ability to waive the consultation 
requirement.268 First, juveniles fail to understand the significance of having or 
waiving this consultation.269 Second, allowing juveniles to potentially waive this 
requirement provides law enforcement with an incentive to manipulate juveniles 
that are unintelligent and unknowing of their Miranda rights.270 Third, giving 
juveniles the responsibility to exercise sacred constitutional rights runs in 
contradiction with society restricting their engagement in significant decisions 
and activities.271 Thus, lawmakers must recognize that juveniles fail to 
understand the significance of waiving a consultation with an attorney and 
neither juveniles or parents can waive the consultation requirement.272 
Legislation must also prevent two negative characteristics of SB 1052.273 
Legislation must expressly include a provision that deems juvenile statements 
inadmissible when made without an attorney consultation.274 Just like Miranda, 
when the incentive to circumvent the law is removed, law enforcement is more 
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likely to abide by its conditions.275 To illustrate, SB 1052 only required a court to 
consider the effect of law enforcement violating its consultation requirement.276 
In contrast, the Miranda warnings require all statements made in violation of 
Miranda to be excluded under the exclusionary rule.277 By not requiring the 
exclusion of these statements, SB 1052 essentially provided a solution that lacked 
any real substance.278 Under SB 1052, law enforcement could completely 
disregard the mandatory consultation requirement and still succeed in having a 
juvenile’s statement admitted in court.279 Legislation must avoid a similar 
invitation for abuse and expressly render statements as inadmissible when given 
in violation of the consultation requirement.280 
Lastly, legislation must also exclude exceptions and respect a juvenile’s 
constitutional rights under all circumstances.281 Under Miranda and its progeny, 
the Supreme Court created exceptions under the public safety exception that 
reduced the effectiveness of the Miranda warnings.282 SB 1052 also included an 
exception where law enforcement could ignore the consultation requirement if it 
reasonably believed a person or property to be in danger.283 Such exceptions 
unfairly place conditions on a juvenile’s constitutional rights.284 However, a 
juveniles protection should not be conditional and must be absolute.285 Unlike SB 
1052, future legislation must exclude exceptions and respect a juvenile’s 
constitutional rights under all circumstances.286 
In sum, legislation must: (1) require the presence of an attorney when 
juveniles are interrogated and create a presumption that juvenile statements are 
not knowingly and intelligently made when an attorney is not present, (2) provide 
that the presumption can be overcome only after they consult with an attorney, 
(3) explicitly prohibit them the ability to waive this requirement, (4) exclude 
exceptions, and (5) deem statements inadmissible when received in violation of 
the consultation requirement.287 
 
275. Compare Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467, with SB 1052, 2016. 
276. SB 1052, 2016 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (as amended on Mar. 28, 2016, but not enacted). 
277. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. 
278. Mendoza, supra note 273, at 801; SB 1052, 2016. 
279. Mendoza, supra note 273, at 801; SB 1052, 2016. 
280. Mendoza, supra note 273, at 801; SB 1052, 2016. 
281. Compare Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467, with SB 1052, 2016.  
282. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. 
283. SB 1052, 2016 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016) (as amended on Mar. 28, 2016, but not enacted).  
284. Compare Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467, with New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655–56 (1984). 
285. See Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962).  
286. Compare Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467, with SB 1052, 2016.  
287. Infra Part V. 
 The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 49 
259 
B. Judicial Reevaluation 
The current political tensions in both federal and state legislatures make it 
unlikely that the above legislative solution will be enacted in states, like 
California, that have not already taken the initiative.288 However, courts 
themselves can take the initiative to reevaluate the current Miranda framework 
and restore Miranda’s spirit and purpose.289 Lawyers in every level of the court 
system, both state and federal, can pressure courts to reexamine Miranda and 
argue that the unique and vulnerable characteristics of juveniles require a 
modified Miranda framework.290 Recent Supreme Court cases reflect a 
willingness by the Court to recognize juvenile developmental immaturity and 
modify legal standards to account for this immaturity.291 Attorneys can pressure 
courts to either retract previous cases that substantially changed Miranda or to 
create a separate legal framework for juveniles—“Miranda II” for example.292 
This pressure can take several forms.293 
Courts can require that juveniles consult with an attorney prior to 
questioning.294 For example, in Lewis v. State, the Supreme Court of Indiana 
required that juveniles consult with either an adult, guardian, or attorney before 
deciding to waive their rights if their statements were to be used against them at a 
trial or at a hearing.295 There, seventeen-year-old Douglas Lewis was handed a 
copy of the police department’s Miranda rights and waiver form, while an officer 
read it out loud to him.296 After signing this form, Douglas confessed to an 
assault and robbery that resulted in a death.297 
The Court determined that clear rules were needed for efficient police 
procedure and to protect important constitutional rights and found that the age of 
a suspect could clearly define these standards.298 In terms of law enforcement, the 
court reasoned that police officers should not decide in the heat of an 
investigation the complex question of whether a waiver is legally sufficient when 
made by a juvenile.299 On the juvenile side, the court reasoned that when a 
juvenile is interrogated it is perhaps the most serious event of his or her young 
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life.300 Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Indiana concluded that treating juveniles 
the same as an adult when they waive their constitutional rights would not only 
be inconsistent with social norms, but also unjust.301 The court stating the 
following: 
The concept of establishing different standards for a juvenile is an 
accepted legal principle since minors generally hold a subordinate and 
protected status in our legal system. There are legally and socially 
recognized differences between the presumed responsibility of adults and 
minors. . . . As a result of this recognition minors are unable to execute a 
binding contract, unable to convey real property, and unable to marry of 
their own free will. It would indeed be inconsistent and unjust to hold 
that one whom the State deems incapable of being able to marry, 
purchase alcoholic beverages, or even donate their own blood, should be 
compelled to stand on the same footing as an adult when asked to waive 
important Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights at a time most critical to 
him and in an atmosphere most foreign and unfamiliar.302 
Counsel for a juvenile can use the reasoning of the Indiana Supreme Court to 
argue that a juvenile’s privilege against self-incrimination is violated when they 
are only given the Miranda warnings.303 This direct pressure can force courts, 
which are less vulnerable to political influence, to objectively determine if a 
juvenile’s constitutional rights are truly being respected by considering Miranda-
related comprehension studies.304 
Although the United States Supreme Court has limited Miranda to the 
federal constitution, state courts may interpret their own constitutions and require 
a higher standard.305 For example, the Supreme Court of Vermont, in In re E. T. 
C., held that under the Vermont State Constitution juveniles can only voluntarily 
and intelligently waive their right against self-incrimination and the assistance of 
counsel after they are given an opportunity to consult in private with an informed 
and genuinely interested adult who is completely independent and disassociated 
from the prosecution, e.g., a parent or an attorney.306 In E. T. C., a fourteen-year-
old was suspected of breaking into two condominiums with two friends located 
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across the highway from their group home.307 Two officers questioned the 
juvenile in the group home director’s office and read the Miranda warnings.308 
The director claimed he acted as the juvenile’s guardian even though he arranged 
the interrogation.309 
The court recognized that a juvenile cannot choose among the several options 
of legal action without the advice of an adult and adopted the same reasoning as 
the Supreme Court of Indiana.310 The court strictly applied the “genuinely 
interested adult” requirement and found that the director did not satisfy this 
standard even though he was present because “he was not paying attention . . . 
[n]or did the director independently consult with the juvenile or ascertain if the 
juvenile understood the alternatives open to him[,] . . . [and] the director coerced 
the juvenile by implying it was best to ‘come clean’. . . .”311 Counsel for a 
juvenile defendant can argue that their own state constitution requires more than 
what the current Miranda framework requires.312 Using the same reasoning as the 
Vermont Supreme Court, counsel can argue that under their state constitution 
juveniles can only intelligently and voluntarily waive their rights when they are 
assisted by an adult or an attorney.313 The “genuinely interested adult” model can 
provide a foundation for the court to determine if such a requirement is necessary 
given that juveniles fail to generally understand the Miranda warnings.314 
Also, courts may create a per se rule of exclusion for juvenile statements and 
only allow for this per se rule to be overcome after the prosecution has satisfied 
strict requirements.315 For example, the Supreme Court of Kansas, in the Matter 
of B.M.B., created a per se rule of exclusion for statements made by juveniles 
under the age of fourteen.316 There, an officer questioned ten-year-old B.M.B. 
about an alleged rape and persisted until he confessed.317 This per se rule can 
only be overcome if the prosecution can show that the juvenile was given an 
opportunity to consult with his parent, guardian, or attorney and both were 
advised of the juvenile's right to an attorney and to remain silent.318 Similarly, the 
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and Florida,320 have taken this same initiative. The court in the Matter of B.M.B. 
reasoned that the trial court applied a superficial application of the totality of the 
circumstances approach when it treated the defendant like an adult and found that 
approach insufficient to ensure that a juvenile truly made an intelligent and 
knowing waiver of his or her rights.321 Counsel for a juvenile can argue that a per 
se rule should be adopted in their state courts because the application of the 
totality of the circumstances standard to juveniles has been superficially applied 
by the courts and a true evaluation of the unique characteristics of juveniles has 
been neglected.322 
Additionally, courts may mix a per se rule and a general requirement 
depending on the age of the juvenile.323 The Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts, in Commonwealth v. Smith, created a mixed approach to a per se 
rule, placing certain requirements depending on the juvenile’s age.324 There, a 
juvenile’s waiver is considered per se inadmissible if they are under the age of 
fourteen unless a parent or an interested adult was present, understood the 
juveniles rights, and had the opportunity to explain them to the juvenile.325 
Alternatively, juveniles ages 14 to 17 must also be given this opportunity but a 
waiver may still be valid without it if “the circumstances . . . demonstrate a high 
degree of intelligence, experience, knowledge, or sophistication on the part of the 
juvenile.”326 Such an approach creates a spectrum of standards that changes as 
the juvenile’s ability to comprehend their Miranda rights increases.327 Counsel 
for a juvenile can argue for this middle-ground approach to establish a per se rule 
for younger juveniles and only a strict requirement for further developed 
juveniles.328 
Pressuring courts to determine if juveniles can meaningfully waive their 
Miranda rights in light of developmental and cognitive studies, can encourage 
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courts to take the initiative to truly protect juveniles during inherently coercive 
interrogations.329 Miranda is a court-created doctrine, thus courts can modify 
Miranda and restore its purpose and spirit.330 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Constitutional rights are fundamental to our freedom.331 Each person, 
whether young or old, must be entitled to exercise these rights when they matter 
most to them.332 The Supreme Court in Miranda attempted to ensure a suspect 
could exercise these rights by crafting a bright-line rule that applies to all 
suspects.333 However, the Miranda warnings and the framework currently in 
place fail juveniles.334 Generally, juveniles do not understand what these 
warnings guarantee.335 They do not have the communication skills required to 
invoke these rights, and officers take advantage of this disparity to secure a 
juvenile’s waiver and a confession.336 
All people deserve the rights guaranteed in our Constitution.337 The unique 
characteristics of a juvenile demands that a change be made today.338 Police can 
no longer provide ritualistic Miranda warnings that mean nothing to a juvenile.339 
Either legislative or judicial action is needed to ensure that juveniles enjoy the 
same rights we all enjoy under the Constitution.340 
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